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Abstract
It is often said that the world is explained by laws of nature together with
initial conditions. But does that mean initial conditions don’t require fur-
ther explanation? And does the explanatory role played by initial condi-
tions entail or require that time has a preferred direction? This chapter
looks at the use of the ‘initialness defence’ in physics, the idea that ini-
tial conditions are intrinsically special in that they don’t require further
explanation, unlike the state of the world at other times. Such defences
commonly assume a primitive directionality of time to distinguish between
initial and final conditions. Using the case study of the time-asymmetry
of thermodynamics and the so-called ‘past hypothesis’ — the hypothesis
that the early universe was in a state of very low entropy —, I outline and
support a deflationary account of the initialness defence that does not pre-
suppose a basic directionality of time, and argue that there is a relevant
explanatory asymmetry between initial conditions and the state of systems
at other times only if certain causal conditions are satisfied. Hence, the ini-
tialness defence is available to those who reject a fundamental direction of
time.
*Comments welcome (especially if they concern unfortunate typos or project-undermining objections).
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1 Introduction
Eugene Wigner once remarked that ‘[t]he sharp distinction between Initial Con-
ditions and Laws of Nature was initiated by Isaac Newton and I consider this to
be one of his most important, if not themost important, accomplishment’, adding
that prior to Newton, ‘there was no sharp separation between the two concepts’
and that after Newton this sharp separation ‘was taken for granted and rarely
even mentioned’ (Wigner, 1995, p. 334). The terminology of ‘initial’ conditions is
so widespread within physics as to make its usage seemingly unremarkable. But
the very word ‘initial’ connotes the idea of time as directed, deriving from the
Latin for ‘the beginning’; something could not be ‘initial’ without being chrono-
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logically first in some sequence of events, and something could not be chronolog-
ically first without a direction of time relative to which it is first. However, there
are many motivations within fundamental physics for holding time to lack a di-
rection,¹ with the appearance of a direction of time being an emergent feature of
higher-level physics. So what is the relationship between initial conditions and
the direction of time, and how do philosophical views that reject a directionality
of time make sense of the role of initial conditions in physics?
This chapter looks at a particular kind of argument I’ll call the ‘initialness de-
fence’. The general idea is that initial conditions, as opposed to the state of the
system at other times, are explanatorily special in virtue of temporally preceding
all other temporal stages of the relevant system, and not being the result of evo-
lution from earlier states. In ordinary experiments, one can consider the initial
conditions — the state in which the relevant system is prepared in the experimen-
tal set-up — to be a set of information that one does not seek to explain in terms
of the theory being tested. Conversely, the final conditions of the experiment,
namely the measured state at the end of the experiment, is to be explained in
terms of the relevant theory together with the initial conditions. This explanatory
asymmetry between initial conditions and final conditions is present in cosmol-
ogy, such as the cosmological explanation of the second law of thermodynamics,
the details of which I’ll turn to in a moment. The idea in the cosmological case is
that one can design a cosmological model with some assumed initial conditions,
such as the extremely low-entropy early universe, and appeal to this to explain
some particular observed regularity, in our case the steady increase of thermo-
dynamical entropy towards the future. In such cases, the initial conditions are
ordinarily treated as explanatorily special.
Initialness defence. The earliest state of some system is explanatorily special
because it is the only state that did not evolve from some earlier state of
that system.
Initialness defences commonly assume a primitive directionality of time in order
¹See Farr (2020).
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justify distinguishing between initial and final conditions in this way. But what
exactly is the relationship between the initialness defence and the direction of
time? Do initialness defences presuppose a specific metaphysical view of time
direction? And can metaphysical views that hold time to be adirectional — to
lack a preferred direction — employ initialness defences? In what follows, I assess
these issues using the case study of the time asymmetry of thermodynamics.
The standard statistical mechanical account of whymacroscopic systems obey
the second law of thermodynamics relies on the assumption that in the past, en-
tropy was far lower than it is now. Contemporary cosmology posits an extremely
low entropy and thus low probability initial state of the universe, which follow-
ing Albert (2000) is commonly termed the past hypothesis. There has been much
disagreement as to whether the extremely low-probability initial state posited by
the past hypothesis stands in need of explanation (e.g. Price (2004) argues it does;
Callender (2004b) argues it does not), and what would constitute an explanation
of such a thing (e.g. Callender (2004a) questions whether there could in principle
be such an explanation). One thought implicit in a number of considerations of
this issue is a version of the initialness defence, that the past hypothesis is ex-
planatorily special due to being a hypothesis about the earliest temporal part of
the universe, and so not causally dependent upon earlier states. Prima facie, real-
ists about time direction — those who take the directionality of time to be some
basic fact about the world, such as Maudlin (2007) — can make use of the initial-
ness defence, but antirealists about time direction — those who hold either that
time has no direction, or that the directionality of time is an emergent feature of
the macroscopic world, such as Price (1996) — cannot, since on their picture of
the world there is nothing intrinsically special about either temporal ‘end’ of the
universe. I argue this dichotomy is false. Instead, antirealists about time direc-
tion, or ‘C-theorists’ as I will call them, can and should adopt a restricted version
of the initialness defence.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the background to
the debate, introducing the problem of time asymmetry in statistical mechanics
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and the role played by the past hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the B- and C-
theories of time, and the debate between realist and antirealist accounts of the
direction of time. In section 4 I assess Maudlin’s B-theoretic version of the initial-
ness defence in the context of the past hypothesis, and Huw Price’s C-theoretic
rejection of it. Section 5 presents a C-theoretic ‘deflationary’ version of the ini-
tialness defence, motivated by a position outlined by Hans Reichenbach, and ar-
gues the deflated initialness defence preserves the ontological simplicity of the
C-theorywhilst marking out the past hypothesis as explanatorily special. Section
6 is the conclusion.
2 Explaining the arrow of time
2.1 The time asymmetry of thermodynamics
Imagine an ordinary irreversible process like the smashing of a wine glass: I take
a wine glass out of the cupboard, drop it on the floor, and it shatters into tiny
pieces. Such a process is (hopefully) not especially familiar but it’s certainly far
more familiar than the temporal opposite process; the process run from future to
past involves a bunch of shards of glass spontaneously starting to jiggle on the
kitchen floor due to an injection of impetus from heat on the floor causing the
shards to jump together, forming a smooth wine glass, before bouncing up into
my hand. Whereas the original process certainly sounds a plausible candidate
for what can happen in a kitchen, the second process does not. This asymme-
try between two processes here reflects a greater asymmetry of things in time
described by the second law of thermodynamics. One of the most familiar state-
ments of the second law is Rudolf Clausius’ (1864, p. 44) ‘Die Entropie der Welt
strebt einem Maximum zu,’ or ‘the entropy of the world tends towards a maxi-
mum.’ This introduces the notion of entropy, which is taken to be a measure of
the energy of a system from which work cannot be extracted. More familiarly,
we can state the second law as follows:
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Second Law of Thermodynamics. The entropy of an isolated subsystem of the
world does not decrease.²




2.2 Boltzmannian statistical mechanics
The latter half of the 19th century saw the development of statistical mechanics in
the work of (among others) Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs, with the central idea
being that thermodynamic regularities can be accounted for in terms of the statis-
tics of the constituents of sufficiently large mechanical systems, or in Gibbs’ case
the statistics of ensembles of mechanical systems. The discussion of this chapter
is based on the Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics.³ To understand
the Boltzmannian statistical mechanical account, we need a bit of mathematics.
The state of a classical Hamiltonian system of n particles is given by the specifica-
tion of the positions and momenta of all the particles in the system. To simplify,
we can use the concept of a phase space, denoted by the symbol Γ. A phase space
is an abstract mathematical space in which each point represents a complete kine-
matically possible microstate of the system in question—in this case the position
²There exist many different statements of the second law (see Uffink (2001)), and many dif-
ferent definitions of entropy (see Maroney (2009)). As Price (2002) notes, the precise version of
the second law, and the definition of ‘entropy’ are relatively inessential to the issue of the rela-
tion between time direction and thermodynamics. The example of the wine glass is sufficient to
illustrate the kind of time asymmetry with which this chapter is concerned.
³There are two main approaches to statistical mechanics, owing to the work of Boltzmann
and Gibbs respectively. I shall work within the Boltzmannian framework. Gibbsian statistical
mechanics (Gibbs, 1902) is distinct from Boltzmannian statistical mechanics in a number of ways.
The Gibbsian approach is characterised by considering an ensemble of systems, each with slightly
different microscopic states. As Frigg (2009) notes, both approaches are widely used within the
literature but generally for different purposes: the Gibbsian approach is used in practice (i.e.
experiments); the Boltzmannian approach is used in consideration of foundational issues (e.g.
philosophical issues concerning the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics). See
Wallace (2020) and Robertson (2020, 2021) for recent defences of the Gibbsian approach.
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and momentum values of each particle.⁴ For a system of n particles, the phase
space has 6n dimensions, with a point in the 6n phase space picks out a unique
set of position and momentum values (in three-dimensional physical space) for
each particle in the system. Given this, the evolution of a many-particle classi-
cal system can be illustrated by a curve in Γ, and thus the dynamics describes
curves in Γ. A point in Γ picks out amicrostate of the system in question. In ther-
modynamics, a state of a system is given in terms of macroscopic (observable)
parameters, such as the pressure, volume and temperature of a gas. One of the
key observations in the development of statistical mechanics is the identification
of the thermodynamic macrostate of a system with a region of Γ. In this sense,
the macrostate of a system supervenes on its microstate—there can be no change
in the system’s macrostate without a change in its microstate—but not vice versa.
Central to the Boltzmannian account is the application of the ‘standard’
(Lebesgue) measure to the ‘microcanonical ensemble’—that each microstate on a
hypersurface of fixed energy on the phase space is assigned equal probability.⁵
Given this, regions of phase space can be assigned measurable volumes. Boltz-
mann famously provided the following statistical mechanical definition of the
entropy, S, of a system as proportional to natural logarithm of the volume of its
phase space corresponding to its macrostate, where, given the standard measure,
W corresponds to the amount of microstates corresponding to the system’s
⁴In order for a point in phase space to play this role, the phase space must have the right
dimensionality. The state of a one-particle system is provided by two quantities: the position and
the momentum of the particle. If the particle is in a three-dimensional physical space, then its
position andmomentum each have coefficients in each spatial dimension: the position is provided
by the triple (qx, qy , qz) corresponding to its location in each spatial dimension (x, y and z); and
the momentum is provided the triple (px, py , pz). Thus, for a one-particle system, the phase space
has 6 dimensions—three for position; three for momentum—such that each point in this space
denotes a unique set of position and momentum values, with the entire space covering every
possible state of the one-particle system.
⁵This assumption is one of the central problems concerning Boltzmannian statistical
mechanics—see Sklar (2006) for a survey. The justifiability of Boltzmannian microcanonical prob-
ability distribution has historically concerned Liouville’s Theorem (which holds that regions of
phase space of fixed energy are invariant under Hamiltonian evolution) and the Ergodic Hy-
pothesis. See Frigg (2008) for a discussion of the relation between the ergodic hypothesis and
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics.
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macrostate, and k is Boltzmann’s constant (1.38062× 10−23JK−1).
S = k lnW (2)
This tells us that the larger the volume of phase space corresponding to some
macrostate of a systemX , the greater the entropy ofX . It follows from this that
for any gas, given no further constraints on its macrostate than the Boltzmannian
statistical considerations, at any time the gas is most likely to be in the highest-
entropy available macrostate and hence in equilibrium.
To complete the necessary details of the Boltzmannian account, we need to
make an assumption about the dynamics of points in phase space—microstates—
namely that they are quasi-ergodic.⁶ The ergodic hypothesis holds that the infi-
nite time averages of systems are such that the proportion of time spent in each
macrostate corresponds to the volume of the macrostate given by the standard
measure. What this means is that for any point in Γ (except for a set of measure
zero), its evolution over infinite time is such that the time spent in each of its
available macrostate is directly proportional to its volume.⁷ Given the assump-
tion that systems are quasi-ergodic, it follows that systems in small regions of
phase space (low entropy) tend to evolve towards larger regions of phase space
(higher entropy), and spend the majority of time in the largest region of phase
space, which corresponds to the equilibrium state—maximal entropy. It follows
that given a non-maximal entropymacrostate, it is overwhelmingly probable that
its microstate is such that its evolution leads towards macrostates of higher en-
tropy.
As such, we can see quite simply that the reason non-equilibrium systems
tend towards higher entropy is that there are moreways for a system to have high
entropy. Given this, as Wallace (2011, p. 1) puts it, the overwhelming tendency of
⁶Frigg and Werndl (2011) argue that a weaker property that that of ergodicity—‘epsilon
ergodicity’—is sufficient for Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and avoids the problems of the
KAM and Marcus-Meyer theorems.
⁷The status of the ergodic hypothesis has been the subject of a particularly massive literature
that does not concern us in the present chapter. See Sklar (1993, ch. 5) for a review.
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systems to approach equilibrium is ‘basically just a consequence of the geometry
of phase space.’ For a system of low entropy left to evolve in phase space, it will
invariably tend towards higher entropy simply because high entropymacrostates
take upmuch larger regions of phase space than do low entropymacrostates. This
gives us two kinds of ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ states for systems; ones that, assuming
nothing else, systems can be expected to be in without requiring further expla-
nation:
Normal Macrostate. A normal macrostate for a system is one that corresponds
to maximal entropy (its ‘equilibrium state’).
Normal Microstate. A normal microstate for a system in non-equilibrium is one
that evolves towards equilibrium.⁸
2.3 What is the past hypothesis?
The problem with this kind of statistical mechanical reasoning is that it works
too well. Towards the future, where we expect entropy to increase, the reason-
ing works fine. But if we try to use the same reasoning towards the past then
we should also think that it’s far more likely for any system in a non-maximum-
entropy state to have evolved from a higher-entropy state and not from a lower-
entropy state, contrary to our beliefs and apparent observations. This is a major
problem insofar as the statistical method only gives us a time asymmetry of en-
tropy if we explicitly assume that in the past entropy was far lower than it is
now.  Without such an assumption, the statistical method implies that both the
future and past are higher entropy than the present, so we end up with a sceptical
problem about the past (implying that our apparent records and memories of the
past are false) and are unable to ground the time asymmetry of the Second Law. 
Boltzmann suggested that such a low-entropy assumption about the past is a
crucial aspect of the statistical explanation of the second law:
⁸A normal microstate for a system in equilibrium is one that stays in equilibrium (in both
temporal directions).
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The second law of thermodynamics can be proved from the mechan-
ical theory if one assumes that the present state of the universe […]
started to evolve from an improbable state and is still in a relatively
improbable state. (Boltzmann, 1967)
The idea suggested by Boltzmann in this passage is that we need to put in an
assumption of a low-entropy past in by hand, and that once we do that then the
statistical method gives back the tendancy for entropy to increase monotonically
towards the future.⁹ The same conclusion is reached by Richard Feynman in his
Lectures on Gravitation:
The success of [scientific inferences] indicates that the world did not
come from a fluctuation […] Therefore I think it is necessary to add
to the physical laws the hypothesis that in the past the universe was
more ordered […] than it is today—I think this is the additional state-
ment that is needed to make sense, and to make an understanding of
[thermodynamic] irreversibility. (Feynman et al., 1971)
This idea that we need to make an assumption of a low-entropy past to com-
plement the Boltzmannian statistical method is elaborated on by Albert (2000),
where he terms the idea the ‘past hypothesis’, which has become the common
terminology in the literature. The idea is that the past hypothesis complements
the statistical mechanical account of the entropy gradient by stipulating a low en-
tropy constraint on a past macrostate of the world. Thus, for some non-maximal
entropy system, such as a half-melted ice cube on a warm plate, the statistical me-
chanical prediction is unconstrained—we predict that the ice cube will be more
melted in 5 minutes—, but the retrodiction is constrained insofar as it is condi-
tional upon the stipulated low-entropy past macrostate. Call this macrostate (fol-
lowing Callender 2004a) the Past State. We can define the past hypothesis as
⁹However, this remark is not elaborated on in much detail by Boltzmann, and he elsewhere
entertained the hypothesis that the low entropy past is simply the result of a large fluctuation
from thermal equilibrium made probable by the universe being significantly older than standard
cosmological models assume, and for the most part in thermal equilibrium.
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follows:
Past Hypothesis. Thehypothesis that at some point in the distant past, the world
occupied an extremely low-entropy macrostate—the Past State.
On Albert’s (2000) account, the past hypothesis corrects the faulty retrodic-
tions of statistical mechanics, namely the overwhelming likelihood that the past
was higher entropy, implying that all apparent records and memories of a lower-
entropy past are misleading. The big problem with the past hypothesis is the
sheer improbability of the Past State. Penrose (1989) calculates the probability of
the universe having been in a state of sufficiently low entropy to be 1 in 1010
123
.¹⁰
According to the past-hypothesis-based statistical mechanical explanation of the
entropy gradient, the assumption that such a low-probability state occurred is a
key part of the explanation of any mundane thermodynamic regularity, such as
the inevitably underwhelming final sips of my now-cold flat white.
Boltzmann himself thought the past hypothesis ‘is a reasonable assumption
to make since it enables us to explain the facts of experience, and one should
not expect to be able to deduce it from anything more fundamental’ (Boltzmann,
1967), emphasising the lack of a need to offer a special explanation of the past
hypothesis itself. Various authors have offered a range of explanatory options,
from Boltzmann’s no-explanation-needed option, to Albert’s related suggestion
that the past hypothesis possesses a Kantian-type epistemic status in that it is a
necessary precondition for knowledge of the past, to Callender’s (2004a) sugges-
tion that the past hypothesis has the status of a non-dynamical law of nature. But
we are here going to assess only the role of the initialness defence in the expla-
nation of the past hypothesis, and to do that we’ll focus on Maudlin’s initialness
defence, Price’s rejection of such an approach, and my own preferred ‘deflated’
version of the initialness defence that is motivated by remarks made by Hans
Reichenbach (1956).
¹⁰Though it should be used that Penrose’s calculation is in the context of black hole thermody-
namics, using Bekenstein–Hawking entropy rather than Boltzmann entropy.
What’s So Special About Initial Conditions? | Matt FaRR | NovembeR 16, 2021 12
So, we are in a position now to present the past-hypothesis-based statistical
mechanical explanation of the entropy gradient with which the rest of the chap-
ter is concerned: the universe is, at one temporal end, in a macrostate of very
low entropy (the Past State), and there is a monotonically-increasing entropy
gradient towards the other temporal end (entailed by applying the Boltzman-
nian method to the Past State and projecting in one temporal direction) until a
maximal-entropy state at the other temporal end, which we may term the Future
State. On this model, the past hypothesis plays two main problem-solving roles.
Firstly, it allows for there to be an entropy gradient at all (without the existence
of a low-entropy state, there’d be no room for entropy to increase). Secondly, the
past hypothesis corrects the retrodictions of statistical mechanics; we need the
past hypothesis to validate our beliefs about a low-entropy past.
Even given the past hypothesis, there is still a major problem. Towards the
past we have processes which are anti-thermodynamical in that they are entropy-
decreasing and hence highly improbable. Maudlin (2007) argues that the assump-
tion of a fundamental direction of time allows us to make an initialness defence
here: the apparently improbable behaviour towards the past is really just proba-
ble behaviour towards the future, with the lowest-entropy state (the Past State)
being the temporally earliest, ensuring all ‘real’ evolution is entropy-increasing
and so thermodynamically normal. On the contrary, Price (2002, 2004), an antire-
alist about time direction, holds that this improbable behaviour towards the past
is reason to think that the past hypothesis requires further explanation. I shall
now argue that this sets up a false dichotomy between realists and antirealists
about time direction. Instead, I argue that antirealists about time direction, or
‘C-theorists’ as I will call them, can and should adopt a restricted version of the
initialness defence. In order to set this out, I’ll first introduce the C-theory of
time and what it means to reject that time has a direction.
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3 Directionless time: Understanding the C-theory
In order to set up the opposing camps regarding the initialness defence, I’ll intro-
duce two alternative theories of time: the B-theory; and the C-theory. We can
start with simple definitions of the two theories before adding some details to
how they differ.
B-theory of time. The world is directed in time from earlier to later.
C-theory of time. The world is not directed in time.
The B- and C-theories derive from McTaggart’s (1908) B-series and C-series.
McTaggart presented three different understandings of how things could be or-
dered in time. The A-series orders things in terms of whether they’re past present
or future, such as the extinction of the dinosaurs being past, the displaying of
dinosaur fossils in the Natural History Museum present, and the genetically-
modified-dinosaur apocalypse future. The A-series captures how things appear
to change in time: for example, your reading of this sentence is, for me (at the
time of writing), future, but for you it is present, and as of the time of your reading
the next sentence it is past. In this sense events change their A-series properties
as time passes. The B-series preserves the directionality of the A-series, ordering
things from earlier to later — e.g. my writing of this sentence is earlier than your
reading it. But the B-series doesn’t change in the way the A-series does; if x is
earlier than y, this is a fact that does not change over time in any sense, so there
is no need to update or redraw the B-series over time.
McTaggart also introduced the much-less-talked-about C-series, which he
took to provide an undirected ordering of things in time, noting that the C-series,
‘while it determines the order, does not determine the direction’ of a set of events.
The implied ordering relation of the C-series in McTaggart (1908) is temporal be-
tweenness: a C-series tells us what events are between which other events in time,
with this betweenness ordering being insensitive to whether the ordering goes
in one time direction rather than the other.
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[T]he C series, while it determines the order, does not determine
the direction. If the C series runs M, N, O, P, then the B series from
earlier to later cannot run M, O, N, P, or M, P, O, N, or in any way
but two. But it can run either M, N, O, P (so that M is earliest and
P latest) or else P, O, N, M (so that P is earliest and M latest). And
there is nothing […] in the C series […] to determine which it will be.
(McTaggart, 1908, p. 462; my emphasis.)
In the C-series, the event of you reading this sentence is located between your
reading of the previous sentence and the next sentence, but this ‘temporal be-
tweenness’ ordering has no directionality built into it. Building time out of an
undirected relation like betweenness gives a picture of time as ordered but undi-
rected, with one direction no more important than the other. A consequence of
this is that there is no such thing as the temporal reverse of a C-series of events,
since whichever direction one chooses to describe events, the same betweenness
relations hold (even ‘backwards’ in time your reading of this sentence is between
your reading of the previous and next sentences).
Unlike the A-theory, the B- and C-theories contain no special ‘present mo-
ment’ of time — the time we consider present can be considered to be indexical,
like the term ‘here’, in that what is ‘present’ is simply what is simultaneous with
us at the particular relevant moment of time that we are thinking or speaking.
As such, there is no observer-independent flow or passage of time on the B- and
C-theories — they are both versions of the so-called ‘block universe’, wherein
events we think of as being in the past or future are as real as events we think
of as present. The difference between the B- and C-theories is simply that the
B-theory contains a basic directionality of time — it is a fact that the world runs
from earlier to later and not later to earlier, that the Big Bang happened at the be-
ginning and not the end of time. On the C-theory, the universe does not contain
sufficient temporal structure to distinguish between an earlier-to-later universe
and a later-to-earlier universe, and as such there is no such fact about the Big
Bang being at the beginning rather than the end of time.
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Dynamic Directed Ordered
A-theory 3 3 3
B-theory 7 3 3
C-theory 7 7 3
Table 1: A-theories, B-theories and C-theories understood in terms of a descending hierarchy
of structure attributed to time, from Farr (2020).
Though the terminology might be new, various people have defended ver-
sions of the C-theory. Thomas Gold, when setting out a temporally adirectional
position motivated by the time symmetry of classical mechanics, noted:
[T]he description of our universe in the opposite sense of time […]
sounds very strange but it has no conflict with any laws of physics.
Our strange description is not describing another universe, or how
it might be but isn’t, but it is describing the very same thing. (Gold,
1966, p. 327)
A decade earlier, Hans Reichenbach, in a book that almost certainly influenced
Gold’s position, held:
Positive and negative time supply equivalent descriptions, and it
would be meaningless to ask which of the two descriptions is true.
Reichenbach (1956, pp. 31–32)
The basic idea behind both claims is that whether we describe things from past to
future, or from future to past, we are simply giving two alternative descriptions of
the same possible world; there’s no such thing as this world but run backwards in
time; there’s no basic underlying direction of time. If you try to imagine this uni-
verse running backwards in time, the Reichenbach–Gold view holds that you’re
just imagining the same universe but from a different and unfamiliar temporal
perspective. Crucially, all the same temporal facts (i.e. the temporal betweenness
facts) are the same across these two alternative time-directed descriptions.
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Though both these quotes are from within the discussion of the time sym-
metry of classical mechanics, Reichenbach (1956, pp. 128–9) also discusses this
C-theoretic attitude within the context of time-asymmetric laws like the second
law of thermodynamics, noting that ‘it has no meaning to say that entropy “re-
ally” goes up or that its time direction is “really” positive’, but rather that we
conventionally prefer to talk about the universe in the direction in which entropy
increases; if we were to describe it in the direction which entropy decreases (from
future the past) we wouldn’t be getting anything wrong about time, but would
simply going against the standard convention and adopting an unfamiliar tempo-
ral perspective.
4 Initialness and the past hypothesis
With the B- and C-theories of time in hand we can think about how they differ
when it comes to explaining the low-entropy past.
4.1 Maudlin’s initialness defence
Maudlin (2007) is a prominent defender of the version of the B-theory.¹¹ Though
an advocate of the block universe, he takes there to be a primitive directionality of
time (which he calls ‘passage’, though devoid of the metaphysics of the A-theory)
in virtue of which later states of the world ‘are produced by’ earlier states of the
world, with no such feature being assigned to the opposite direction of time. On
this picture, it is a fact that we live in an entropy-increasing world and not an
entropy-decreasing world, something Maudlin takes not to be available to the
antirealist about time direction (the C-theorist). Crucially, Maudlin takes this B-
theoretic fact to play a key role in explaining the thermodynamic asymmetry in
a very specific way.
¹¹Indeed, Maudlin (2007, p. 126, fn. 11) describes his own position as a ‘B-series theory’ as
opposed to a ‘C-series theory’, fitting with the B/C-theory distinction I’ve set out.
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Maudlin distinguishes between two different ways in which entropy-
increasing processes (such as the spreading out of gas in a room, the melting of
an ice cube, and the smashing of wineglasses) are atypical and hence needy of
explanation. Firstly they are macroscopically atypical in that their initial states
are low-entropy. But there is also a second kind of atypicality we can call dy-
namical atypicality: the microstates of entropy-increasing systems are atypical
insofar as backwards evolution (towards the temporal past) leads towards lower
entropy. Imagine that midway through the process of an ice cube melting on a
warm plate you freeze-frame the system. Given the assumption that the ice cube
was less melted in the past, it follows that if you imagine this process running
in reverse, the microstate of the system would have to be vastly improbable
insofar as the arrangement of positions and momenta of the molecules would
lead the system to a state of macroscopically lower entropy, despite there being
vastly more microstates compatible with the present macrostate that would lead
towards higher entropy in the past. In other words, any apparently ordinary
thermodynamical process is dynamically atypical if viewed from future to past.
Of this kind of dynamical atypicality, Maudlin remarks:
[The microstates of such systems are] atypical in a way that can
only be characterized in terms of how the state will ‘evolve’ though
time [in that…] temporal evolution in one direction from it will lead,
over a very long period of time, to monotonically lower entropy.
(Maudlin, 2007, pp. 132–3)
Maudlin’s solution is to hold that past-to-future evolutions of systems are real
and future-to-past evolutions are not, and so there is no sense in which systems
in the world are actually dynamically atypical. In other words, once the direction
of time (from past to future) is stipulated as a fundamental fact about the world,
this entails that macroscopic systems only evolve towards more probable and
not less probable states over time. As such, the problem of dynamical atypicality,
Maudlin argues, is explained away on the B-theory.
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[Dynamical atypicality] is completely accounted for by how it was
generated or produced[; it is] the product of an evolution from [an]
initial state[; and] [t]his sort of explanation requires that there be
a fact about which states produce which[, which] is provided by a
direction of time. (Maudlin, 2007, pp. 133–4)
This is not to say that the macroscopic atypicality of the past hypothesis is ex-
plained away, but rather that the fact that systems behave anti-thermodynamically
towards the past is explained away. On Maudlin’s B-theoretic account, the Past
State is not the ‘result’ of temporal/causal evolution; it is this that makes
Maudlin’s argument a version of the initialness defence. It is thus implied by
Maudlin that dynamical atypicality is a genuine problem for the C-theorist, since
by rejecting a fundamental direction of time the C-theorist is committed to the
idea that future-to-past evolutions are as real as past-to-future evolutions, and
so in this way the B-theorist has recourse to an initialness defence that the
C-theorist lacks.
4.2 Price’s rejection of the initialness defence
So isMaudlin right to hold that the C-theorist is troubled by dynamical atypicality
in a way the B-theorist is not? I’ll argue that he is not, and that the C-theorist
does indeed have access to the right kind of initialness defence here. But first it is
important to show that at least some defenders of the C-theory appear to agree
with Maudlin’s contention. Consider, for example, the following passage from
Price:
Imagine that in recent years physics had discovered that the matter
in the universe is collapsing towards a big crunch […] and that as it
does so, something very peculiar is happening. The motions of the
individual pieces of matter in the universe are somehow conspiring
to defeat gravity’s overwhelming tendency to pull things together.
Somehow, by some extraordinary feat of cooperation, the various
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forces are balancing out, so that matter will […] spread itself out
with great uniformity. (Price, 2004, p. 230)
But, Price continues,
[T]his state of affairs is exactly what physics has discovered! I’ve
merely taken advantage […] of the fact that […] there is no objective
sense in which what we call the future is really the ‘positive’ direc-
tion of time. […] Relabelled [from future to past], the familiar expan-
sion from a smooth big bang becomes a contraction to a smooth big
crunch, with the extraordinary characteristics just described. And
surely if it is a proper matter for explanation described one way, it
is a proper matter for explanation described the other way. (Price,
2004, pp. 230–1; emphasis in original)
Though Price presents this in the form of an intuition pump, we can go further
and construct it in the form of a deductive argument as follows:
P1. Forwards and backwards time are equivalent [central thesis of C-theory]
P2. An evolution from a low-entropy past state is equivalent to an evolution
towards a low-entropy ‘future’¹² state [implied entailment of P1]
P3. An evolution towards a low-entropy ‘future’ state would demand a special
explanation [intuition]
C. Therefore, an evolution from a low-entropy past state demands a special ex-
planation [from P2 &
P3]
It is not clear whether Price explicitly endorses this exact argument, but these
passages function as an intuition pump for P3 based on the assumption of P2, the
key premises of the argument. It is P2 that I think can and should be rejected.
¹²Here, a ‘future’ state is simply the Past State described in negative time.
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5 Deflating the initialness defence
5.1 Reunderstanding the C-theory
Rejecting P2 involves putting forward a different understanding of the C-theory.
Such a version is motivated by remarks made by Reichenbach (1956), which I else-
where (Farr, 2020, 2021) term time direction conventionalism, according to which
there are no time-directed facts, but it is more convenient to describe the world
from past to future. Central to the Reichenbachian account is the idea that al-
though past-to-future and future-to-past descriptions of the world are equiva-
lent, it does not follow that it is as true to say that the Past State is a product
of entropy-decreasing behaviour as it is to say that the present state is the prod-
uct of entropy-increasing behaviour. As such, this offers a middle-ground option
that preserves intuitions behind both Maudlin’s and Price’s approaches by hold-
ing that there is an objective causal direction of processes in time, but that it is
as true to describe things from future to past as from past to future.
Whilst discussing past-to-future and future-to-past descriptions of the en-
tropy gradient, Reichenbach (1956, p. 154) remarks:
The two languages L1 [a language in which the positive direction
of time is that of increasing entropy] and L2 [a language in which
the positive direction of time is that of decreasing entropy] represent
equivalent descriptions; one is as true as the other.
But he adds:
If someone argues that it is a matter of convention to select the di-
rection of growing entropy [as opposed to decreasing entropy] as
the direction of time, [their] conception cannot be called false. But
[they] must not commit the error often connected with other forms
of conventionalism: the error of overlooking the empirical content
associated with the use of this convention. (Reichenbach, 1956, p.
154)
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In order to understand what he has in mind here, it is important to first clarify
how Reichenbach views the relationship between the direction of cause–effect
and direction of increasing entropy. Reichenbach (1956, p. 153–6) makes a subtle
point that has rarely if at all been discussed in the secondary literature, namely
that there are two separate conventions that guide our talk about the increase of
entropy over time. Firstly there is the time direction convention – the tendency to
describe the world in the direction of increasing entropy (and so past-to-future)
and not in the direction of decreasing entropy. Reichenbach says there’s noth-
ing factually wrong about adopting the opposite convention, but it simply goes
against our standardway of talking about theworld. There are pragmatic grounds
for adopting the standard convention; for instance Reichenbach (1956, p. 154) sug-
gests that it matches the ‘time direction of psychological experience’ (though for
criticism of this claim, see Farr (2022)).
Reichenbach also speaks of a second convention I’ll call the causal convention,
namely the convention that happenings in the world are explained by the tem-
poral past rather than temporal future. The alternative convention would be to
prefer a teleological mode of explanation, what Reichenbach refers to as a ‘princi-
ple of finality’, according to which things are explained in terms of the temporal
future. What is key is how the time-direction convention and causal convention
go together. See Table 2 for the four options these provide. On Reichenbach’s
conventionalist account, Options 1 and 4 are equivalent descriptions, and Options
2 and 3 are equivalent descriptions. But neither 1 or 4 are equivalent to 2 or 3.
Reichenbach takes the former of these equivalence classes (1 and 4) to ade-
quately describe the world: the world is either a causal entropy-increasing world
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(Option 1), or a teleological entropy-decreasing world (Option 4), noting that
when taking the direction of time to be a convention, one must not overlook ‘the
empirical content associated with the use of this convention’ (ibid). The empirical
fact Reichenbach points out is what he calls the ‘parallelism of entropy increase’
for systems: for quasi-isolated subsystems of the universe, as well as the universe
itself, the directions of increasing entropy are parallel in that they increase in en-
tropy in the same direction and not in different directions.¹³ This allows us to talk
of a general positive time direction being defined, which Reichenbach takes to be
an ‘empirical hypothes[is] which [is] convincingly verified’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p.
154). This does not pick out the direction of entropy-increase or entropy-decrease
on its own, since the parallelism itself is not directed. But Reichenbach ties this
parallelism to the notion of causality, noting that ‘the convention of defining pos-
itive time through growing entropy is inseparable from accepting causality as the
general method of explanation’ (ibid.), and further:
Once the direction is assumed in the usual sense [i.e. positive time
is the direction of increasing entropy], it is not a matter of personal
preference, not a mode of consideration, whether we should describe
the world in terms of causes or of ends: it is a physical law that
causality, and not finality, governs the universe. (Reichenbach, 1956,
p. 154)
This can be understood in terms of the asymmetric structure of causal networks,
in which correlations between variables that are not the direct cause or effect
of each other are explainable in terms of their causal past and not their causal
future. Reichenbach discusses this in the context of his principle of common
cause (Reichenbach, 1956, ch. 19), remarking that while some causal forks are
closed to the future, such as when two independent events have a common effect,
¹³Reichenbach’s principle of parallelism of entropy increase: ‘In the vast majority of branch
systems, the directions toward higher entropy are parallel to one another and to that of the main
system’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 136). Equivalently, the directions towards lower entropy are also
parallel.
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‘a common effect cannot be regarded as an explanation’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p.
163) of the correlation. As such, the method for establishing causal direction is
tied to the entropy gradient (e.g. causes are lower in the entropy gradient than
their effects). This asymmetry is taken by Reichenbach to be due to the second
law of thermodynamics in that the existence of a sufficiently low-entropy state
makes it possible for there to be the kind of past-directed common cause structure
for correlated events, meaning that if the Past State is stipulated as the lowest
entropy state, it cannot be considered to be causally influenced by any other
temporal states of the world.
This understanding of the Past State gives a deflationary account of the di-
rection of causation, entailing that there is a direction of causation only in the
presence of the right kind of probabilistic asymmetries, such as irreversible pro-
cesses, time-asymmetric screening-off conditions, and other such things common
to the causal modelling literature. This position is taken by Reichenbach also in
the case of time-symmetrical systems; for example in the case of classical parti-
cle mechanics Reichenbach (1956, ch. II) holds that the relevant causal notion is
one of ‘causal betweenness’ — the physical laws are sensitive to which events are
causally between others, but so long as there is no basic lawlike temporal asym-
metry displayed by systems there is no sense in which some events causally pre-
cede others; for sufficiently time-symmetric systems, causal-direction talk breaks
down. For our purposes, an important consequence of this is that entropy gra-
dients, rather than being explained by further causal facts, are what allows for
the existence of causal explanations of events. This runs contrary to Maudlin’s
realism about causal direction, which holds that ‘even if the world were always
in thermal equilibrium […] later states would arise out of earlier ones’ (Maudlin,
2007, p. 177), where by ‘arise’ Maudlin is referring to causal production, mean-
ing that for Maudlin there would be causal direction facts even in the absence of
the kinds of probabilistic asymmetries central to standard causal discovery algo-
rithms like Reichenbach’s common cause principle and modern descendents of it,
such as the causal Markov condition (see Hausman and Woodward (1999)).
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The convention of taking the direction of entropy-increase to be the direction
of positive time is tied to the convention of causality over finality: once one is
fixed, the other follows empirically. We can regard these as on a par — neither
alone is strictly an empirical matter, but once one is chosen, the other is not open
to choice.
[T]he convention of defining positive time through growing entropy
is inseparable from accepting causality as the general method of ex-
planation. Those who prefer to give an explanation in terms of fi-
nality would be compelled to use the opposite time direction and to
regard time as going from high-entropy to low-entropy. (Reichen-
bach, 1956, p. 154)
What’s not a convention is that either the world is an entropy-increasing causal
world or an entropy-decreasing teleological world.
Compare this to Price’s intuition pump and the argument we constructed
from it. Premise 2 holds that an entropy-increasing causal world is equivalent to
an entropy-decreasing causal world, aligning with Price’s suggestion that, when
described from future to past, we see a world full of coincidences in which local
causes force systems to decrease in entropy over time. But the C-theorist is not
compelled to accept Premise 2 and can instead adopt the Reichenbachian option.
The key difference between the Pricean and Reichenbachian approaches here is
whether or not the Past State can reasonably be considered the result of a series
of coincidences due to an improbably fine-tuned present state of the world. On
the picture Price describes, the description of the world evolving thermodynam-
ically from the Past State is equivalent to the description of the world evolving
anti-thermodynamically towards the Past State. But on the Reichenbachian ac-
count, we can pull apart the time-direction convention and the causal convention
and clarify that it is not true to say that Past State is the causal product of anti-
thermodynamic evolution from a higher-entropy state, and so we get rid of the
problematic unexplained coincidences apparent in Price’s future-to-past descrip-
tion.
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On the Reichenbachian account, when we switch from a past-to-future to a
future-to-past description of the world, we switch a causal explanation of the en-
tropy gradient for a teleological explanation of the entropy gradient, and as such,
in both directions we have an explanation of the entropy gradient in terms of the
past hypothesis and not vice versa. In this way we find a best-of-both-worlds
option between Price and Maudlin’s accounts: (1) we avoid Price’s conclusion
that an entropy-increasing evolution from the Past State requires a special expla-
nation; and (2) we capture the idea from Maudlin’s account that Past State is not
the ‘result’ of temporal/causal evolution without committing to an underlying di-
rectionality of time. This shows that we can have a C-theory of time — one that
holds that past-to-future and future-to-past descriptions of the world are equiv-
alent — that nonetheless supports the idea there is preferred direction of causal
explanation (lower-entropy states can be used to explain higher-entropy states
but not vice versa).
5.2 Initialness, deflated
This takes us to the central conclusion: there is a ‘deflated’ version of initialness
defence available to the C-theorist. On the one hand, B-theorists like Maudlin
take the past-to-future direction as metaphysically privileged, and so the low-
entropy past not as needy of explanation as a low-entropy future would be. And
on the other, C-theorists like Price give up the initialness defence on the grounds
that the description of the world as evolving away from a low entropy past is
equivalent to the alternative description of the world as evolving towards a low
entropy future. But the best-of-both worlds option given by conventionalism
holds instead that when described from future to past, the story of the past hy-
pothesis needs to be understood in teleological rather than in causal terms, so that
entropy-lowering processes are explained in terms of a fact about their temporal
future. On this view, the past hypothesis is still explanatorily special insofar as
other temporal states of the world are explained by way of reference to it and
there is no equivalent way in which it is explained in terms of other states of the
What’s So Special About Initial Conditions? | Matt FaRR | NovembeR 16, 2021 26
world.
On the Reichenbachian approach, we get back a C-theoretic, deflationary ver-
sion of Maudlinian Production; if we are to use the language of causal production
to explain the entropy gradient, then the Past State is a producer but not a prod-
uct of other temporal states of the world. This is something briefly suggested
Reichenbach (1956):
Once the time direction is assumed in the usual sense, it is not a mat-
ter of personal preference […] whether we should describe the world
in terms of causes or ends: it is a physical law that causality, and not
finality, governs the universe. […] For the time direction of growing
entropy […] the interaction point is the beginning, not the end, of
the evolution of the branch system. The statistical relationships […]
account for our conception that the past produces the future, and not
vice versa. (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 155; my emphasis)
Recall that forMaudlin, a ‘primitive’,¹⁴ ‘irreducible’ and ‘fundamental’¹⁵ direction-
ality of time plays a crucial role in this initialness defence, explaining the dynam-
ical atypicality of microstates at all times apart from the initial time. Maudlin’s
argument is an inference to the best explanation in favour of the B-theory. It
follows from Maudlin’s reasoning that only by assuming such a direction of time
(from past to future) can we explain away dynamical atypicality. He adds, in
defence of the B-theory:
[W]e cannot run this trick in reverse. […W]e cannot specify an inde-
pendent, generic constraint on the final state that will yield (granting
the final macrostate is typical) ever decreasing entropy in one direc-
tion. (Maudlin, 2007, p. 133; emphasis added)
But this is simply not the relevant contrast class. The reason we can explain the
Future State¹⁶ in terms of the Past State and not vice versa is not because the Past
¹⁴Maudlin (2007, 172).
¹⁵Both Maudlin (2007, p. 3 & p. 107).
¹⁶Recall that the ‘Future state’ is the hypothetical maximal entropy state in our distant future.
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State is earlier than the Future State. It is instead because, given the Boltzmannian
statistical mechanical account, we can explain the Future State by conditionalis-
ing on the Past State, and we cannot explain the Past State by conditionalising on
the Future State. The explanans here is simply that the Future State is a normal
macrostate, and the Past State is not. Whether the Past State is ‘really’ earlier
or later than the Future State does not enter into this explanation. If the Past
State is earlier than the Future State, then statistical mechanics dictates that the
‘forwards’ direction of time provides the natural (causal) explanation. However,
if we flip to using the future-to-past direction, it is now the ‘backwards’ direction
of time that provides the natural (teleological) explanation.
As such, it is not at all clear why a primitive or fundamental directionality
of time needs to enter the explanation here. Consider two different models of
the entropy gradient using a primitive directionality of time: one in which en-
tropy increases over time; and one in which entropy decreases over time. The
two different models correspond to different B-series. The statistical mechanical
explanation of the Future State in terms of the Past State, and the lack of an ex-
planation of the Past State in terms of the Future State, is itself independent of
the issue as to which state is ‘earlier than’ the other. The statistical mechanical
explanation can only go one way — from past to future, and this is respected by
Reichenbachian time-direction conventionalism, which holds that regardless of
whether we choose an entropy-increasing or entropy-decreasing description, the
entropy gradient is explained in terms of the existence of the Past State and not
vice versa. The important thing is that regardless of whether we use a past-to-
future or future-to-past description, the explanation goes from the Past State (i.e.
the low entropy state) to the Future State (i.e. the high entropy state), and as such
there is no clear need for a further background directionality of time.
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6 Summing up
We started with a puzzle about the nature of initial conditions: in what sense
do laws of nature require there to be genuinely ‘initial’ conditions, and so for
time to have some basic or fundamental preferred direction? By focusing on the
problem of the low-entropy early universe, we considered a potential role for a
fundamental directionality of time — that the dynamical atypicality of the world
when viewed from future to past can be explained away only on the assumption
that really time runs from past to future. I have argued that dynamical atypi-
cality is not as serious a problem as it appears, and that the C-theorist of time
can perfectly well make sense of the Past State as explanatorily special without
there being a fundamental direction of time. On the version of the C-theory de-
fended, the low-entropy early universe is not intrinsically special through being
‘temporally first’ or anything to that effect. Rather, due to the relationship be-
tween entropy and causality, it is the existence of a low-entropy state that allows
there to be a causal direction of systems and hence a clear direction of explana-
tion. As such, initialness defences are available to those that reject that time has
a direction.
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